ISLAMABAD — Former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has lost 85% of vision in his right eye due to a central retinal vein occlusion, a blood clot that caused severe retinal damage, according to medical findings cited by his lawyers, intensifying political tensions and prompting intervention by Pakistan’s top court.

Khan, who is being held at Adiala Jail, first reported blurred vision in late 2025, his legal team said. They allege he was treated with eye drops for nearly three months before being taken to hospital in January 2026, when doctors confirmed extensive retinal damage. Injections were administered, but most of the vision loss proved irreversible, they said.

Central retinal vein occlusion (CRVO) occurs when the main vein draining blood from the retina becomes blocked, potentially leading to permanent vision loss if not treated promptly. Medical records cited by his lawyers attribute the condition to a blood clot.

There is no verified medical evidence of deliberate poisoning. However, speculation circulating on social media and echoed by some party figures alleges that substances may have induced abnormal clotting. The government has not publicly responded in detail to those claims.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court, acting on a report submitted by a lawyer from Khan’s party, issued oral directives on Feb. 13 ordering that he be admitted to a hospital of his choice under supervision of his family and personal doctors, including Dr. Asim Yusuf and Dr. Faisal Sultan, and undergo comprehensive testing, including blood work to assess systemic clotting risks and protect his left eye.

As of Feb. 15, the written order had not yet been issued.

Khan’s supporters have expressed concern over the delay between the oral directives and the formal written order, saying implementation cannot proceed without written instructions. PTI backers assert the Supreme Court is intentionally stalling the written order—required for actionable compliance—mirroring regime "delay tactics" and effectively supporting alleged mistreatment, as Khan risks left-eye damage from untreated clotting.

A government-appointed medical panel is considering transferring Khan to Al-Shifa Trust Eye Hospital, a specialised ophthalmology centre. Khan’s family and personal doctors have requested treatment at Shifa International Hospital, arguing that broader diagnostic facilities are required to investigate potential systemic causes of the clot and ensure transparency.

Supporters have questioned the choice of Al-Shifa Trust, noting that its leadership has historically included retired military officers, and say the episode has further eroded public trust in Pakistan’s military establishment, which critics have long accused of wielding significant political influence. There is no independent evidence showing institutional interference in medical decisions, and the military has not publicly commented on the matter.

The government has said medical procedures are being conducted according to standard protocols but has not released detailed medical documentation.

The dispute over Khan’s treatment has triggered protests by supporters in several provinces, including Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, with some opposition leaders calling for his release on medical grounds.

Khan, removed from office in 2022 and facing multiple legal cases, denies wrongdoing and says the charges against him are politically motivated. The government denies targeting him for political reasons.

His deteriorating eyesight has become the latest flashpoint in Pakistan’s deeply polarised political landscape, as questions remain over the timing of court implementation and the choice of medical facility.

Imran Khan, known worldwide as a celebrated cricketer, could have chosen an easier path, earning significant income through commentary, lectures and writing books, but instead opted for a comparatively difficult road. After the death of his mother, Shaukat Khanum, due to cancer, he decided soon after the 1992 Cricket World Cup that he would establish a cancer hospital in Pakistan where deserving patients could receive treatment free of charge. Initially, medical experts and health professionals dismissed the idea as unrealistic; however, with the establishment of the Shaukat Khanum Memorial Cancer Hospital and Research Centre, thousands of patients over the past several decades have received free or heavily subsidised care, making it a defining symbol of his social vision.

Against this backdrop, Imran Khan decided to enter national politics. He founded a political party named Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), whose core slogan centred on accountability, transparency and the rule of law. Khan spent much of his education and cricket career in the United Kingdom, giving him some familiarity with Western democratic models and governance practices, but domestically he was confronted with Pakistan’s complex civil–military dynamics, a bureaucracy shaped by colonial legacies, and debates around the “deep state” — all factors that have significantly influenced the country’s politics and foreign policy since independence.

Pakistan’s Politics, Military Eras and Khan’s Opposition-Driven Electoral Politics

In Pakistan, multiple military interventions, including the eras of General Zia-ul-Haq and later General Pervez Musharraf, repeatedly interrupted the political process, leaving an institutional imprint that remains visible today. Even before the attacks of 11 September 2001, General Musharraf had imposed martial law, and the subsequent war in Afghanistan once again positioned Pakistan as a pivotal player in the global security architecture. Earlier, during the Cold War, the history of security cooperation among Pakistan, the United States and Afghan mujahideen in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had already deeply shaped regional politics.

Political circles have long reported and discussed that General Musharraf, in a meeting, offered Imran Khan a place in his government, an offer Khan did not accept, preferring to maintain an independent political identity. Following a Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government, Khan entered parliament with a small number of seats in his first elections, which many observers saw not as the culmination but as the starting point of a long political trial and parliamentary learning curve.

After the Panama Papers revelations, the cases against Nawaz Sharif and his disqualification by the Supreme Court turned the 2018 elections into an unusually contentious episode. A number of domestic and international observers suggested that Khan might even attain a two-thirds majority; however, according to official results he formed what many considered a relatively weak coalition government. Critics levelled allegations of electoral manipulation, engineering and institutional interference in the electoral process. These claims were debated across multiple platforms, but have not been conclusively established through any comprehensive judicial commission, leaving the broader narrative fractured and contested.

Foreign Policy, “Absolutely Not” and the Debate on Alleged Regime Change

During Imran Khan’s tenure, several high-profile foreign policy episodes attracted global attention. In a 2021 interview, he responded “Absolutely Not” to a question about allowing US military bases in Pakistan after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, making clear that his government would not permit a permanent American military presence on Pakistani soil. This stance drew both strong support and criticism at home and abroad and became a central pillar of his narrative of a “sovereign foreign policy”.

Khan’s official visit to Moscow during the Russia–Ukraine war became another major flashpoint, as it took place very close to the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. His supporters argue that the visit aimed at securing discounted oil and gas supplies for Pakistan, while critics describe it as a controversial move that sent a problematic signal to Western allies at a highly sensitive geopolitical moment. In this context, a diplomatic cable (cipher) allegedly linked to US official Donald Lu and to Pakistan’s diplomatic engagement with Washington gave rise to the “regime change” narrative. Khan and PTI repeatedly cited this in explaining his ouster, while the US government and various Pakistani officials strongly rejected the allegations and framed the matter as an internal political crisis.

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After Khan’s government was removed through a no-confidence vote in 2022, his supporters framed the event as the product of both external pressure and internal institutional engineering, whereas opposition parties characterised it as a routine exercise of parliamentary democracy under the constitution. As a result, the regime-change debate remains suspended between claims, denials, narratives and perceptions. In the absence of an independent, comprehensive and impartial inquiry, reaching a definitive legal or journalistic conclusion on these allegations is widely viewed as premature and inappropriate.

Economy, Public Pressure and Loss-Making State Enterprises

During Imran Khan’s time in office, various reports pointed to phases of improved growth, higher exports and remittances, and a temporary narrowing of the current account deficit, though economists remained divided on the sustainability of this policy framework and the lack of deeper structural reforms. Critics argued that despite improvements in certain indicators, inflation and unemployment continued to squeeze lower-income groups, prompting opposition parties to organise “inflation marches” and multiple long marches to ratchet up political pressure on the government.

Meanwhile, at the federal level, the 2024–25 fiscal year results for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) revealed that their combined losses had climbed to roughly 832–833 billion Pakistani rupees, while total government financial support to keep them afloat rose to around 2.08 trillion rupees. According to official and media reports, the National Highway Authority (NHA), Quetta Electric Supply Company (QESCO), Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO), Pakistan Railways and PIA Holding were among the entities incurring the heaviest losses, forcing the government to provide continual support through subsidies, guarantees and loans. Economists warn that this trajectory is exacerbating long-term concerns about fiscal sustainability, governance reforms, and the need for privatisation or structural overhaul of these enterprises.

Against this backdrop, the core divergence between government and opposition narratives is that the government attributes SOE losses to legacy policy failures, global economic conditions and energy price shocks, whereas critics highlight alleged corruption, mismanagement and opaque political bargains. Both interpretations, however, underscore the need for independent audits, transparent data and impartial policy reviews — an agenda on which meaningful progress remains limited to date.

Judiciary, Prosecutions and Growing Concern over Imran Khan’s Health

Over the past several years, more than two hundred cases have been registered against Imran Khan, with courts later granting relief or disposing of a number of them on grounds such as acquittal, bail or lack of prosecution. Khan’s lawyers and supporters maintain that many of these cases are politically motivated, while the government and rival parties describe them as lawful processes aimed at ensuring accountability and upholding the rule of law. Recent constitutional amendments and changes in the judicial framework have further fuelled debate over whether the courts can operate fully independently and maintain distance from centres of power, with constitutional experts offering divergent views.

In recent weeks, reports about Imran Khan’s health — particularly his eyesight — have raised serious questions in domestic and international media. According to court filings and medical reports, Khan complained of pain and blurred vision in one eye in late 2025. Subsequent delays in treatment, according to his legal team, led to a blood clot in his right eye, leaving him with an estimated 85 percent loss of vision and only about 15 percent sight remaining in that eye. An ophthalmologist’s report submitted to the court diagnosed a central retinal vein occlusion and noted that, despite treatment including an injection, the damage appears to be partly permanent.

In February 2026, Pakistan’s Supreme Court expressed concern over the situation and directed the government to arrange an immediate and comprehensive medical examination, ensure access to specialist eye doctors, facilitate contact with Khan’s personal physicians, and allow him telephone conversations with his sons. Government representatives insist that the best available medical care is being provided and argue that there is no concrete evidence to substantiate allegations of deliberate malpractice or ill intent by the medical staff.

By contrast, Khan’s lawyers and family say that his complaints were not addressed promptly, that he has faced prolonged difficulties in meeting his counsel and relatives, and that an independent, transparent medical board — including his personal doctors — is essential. On social media and in public debate, some commentators question the nature of the blood clot and the quality of food and healthcare in prison. However, these concerns have not been independently verified through any judicial or investigative process and should therefore be treated as conjecture or expressions of concern rather than established fact.

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan has refused to grant visas to the sons of imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan, as concerns mount over his health and conditions of detention, his party and family members said.

Supporters of Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) rallied in Peshawar on Dec. 7, 2025, demanding his release. The 73-year-old former premier has been held largely in solitary confinement at Adiala Jail in Rawalpindi and has not been seen by family members since early December, according to PTI officials.

Sulaiman and Kasim Khan, who live in London with their mother Jemima Goldsmith, first applied for Pakistani visas in July 2025 and reapplied on Jan. 15 this year, Khan’s sister Aleema Khan told media outlets. The applications remain pending with the Interior Ministry.

A source within the ministry, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the decision to withhold the approvals was deliberate and that authorities intended to deny the visas on technical grounds rather than issue an outright rejection.

The government has not publicly commented on the status of the applications.

Health concerns have intensified after PTI officials and Khan’s personal physician said he was diagnosed with Central Retinal Vein Occlusion (CRVO), a serious eye condition that can cause permanent blindness if untreated.

Dr. Aasim Yusuf, Khan’s physician of more than 20 years, said the condition requires repeated hospital-based treatment, including specialized injections and close monitoring over months or years. He said attempts to examine Khan at Adiala Jail were blocked by authorities.

PTI supporters allege that Khan’s deteriorating health has been used as a political tool. They claim that the military establishment and the government led by military Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif deliberately delayed adequate medical treatment in order to pressure Khan into requesting hospitalisation, which they say could then be portrayed publicly as an attempt to seek a political deal or amnesty, commonly referred to in Pakistan as an “NRO.”

According to PTI officials, Khan has suffered up to 85% vision loss as a result of the untreated condition.

Khan has consistently denied charges against him, including corruption and other convictions, calling them politically motivated retaliation following his fallout with senior military leadership. Some of his convictions have been overturned by courts.

The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has previously described Khan’s imprisonment as arbitrary, while a UN special rapporteur warned that his detention conditions may constitute inhuman or degrading treatment.

Khan’s sons last saw him in 2022 and spoke to him briefly by phone in September 2025. His wife, Bushra Bibi, is also imprisoned in the same complex on separate charges and has been barred from family visits since December.

Despite mounting criticism from rights groups, Pakistan’s government has continued to strengthen diplomatic engagement with Washington. Earlier this month, officials announced Pakistan would participate in a new international initiative known as the “Board of Peace,” associated with former U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposal regarding Gaza.

Kasim Khan told Reuters in December that the family’s “greatest fear is that something irreversible is being hidden from us.”

ISLAMABAD — Protests spread across parts of Pakistan on Thursday after lawyers for jailed former prime minister Imran Khan told the Supreme Court that he has lost approximately 85% of vision in his right eye while in custody, raising concerns about access to medical care and due process.

Khan, 73, has been imprisoned since August 2023 and is serving a 14-year sentence in a corruption case. He denies wrongdoing and says dozens of cases against him were politically motivated to sideline him from politics. The military has denied interference in political affairs.

In a report submitted to the Supreme Court following a court-ordered meeting with Khan, his lawyer Salman Safdar stated that the former premier has been experiencing persistent blurred and hazy vision since October 2025. According to the submission, jail authorities allegedly failed to act in a timely manner.

“He has been left with only 15% vision in his right eye,” Safdar said in the report, seen by Reuters.

The Supreme Court had set a February 16 deadline for authorities to allow Khan access to his personal physician for evaluation. Khan was taken earlier this month for what Information Minister Attaullah Tarar described as a 20-minute eye treatment procedure.

The government has not confirmed the extent of the vision loss but maintains that appropriate medical care has been provided.

Dispute Over Written Court Order

Lawyers and family members of Khan say that although the Supreme Court directed that medical access be facilitated, Chief Justice of Pakistan Yahya Afridi did not issue a written order specifying transfer to a hospital of Khan’s choice.

According to statements attributed to family representatives, they waited on Thursday and Friday for a written directive authorizing transfer to a private medical facility and access to his long-term physicians. They say no formal written order was provided.

The Supreme Court has not publicly responded to these claims.

Legal experts note that written orders are typically required to ensure enforceability and institutional compliance, particularly in high-profile detention cases.

Protests and Police Response

Demonstrations were reported in Islamabad’s Red Zone, including near Parliament Lodges and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa House, where opposition lawmakers staged sit-ins. Protesters also gathered at Swabi Interchange in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, while smaller road blockades were reported in Dera Ismail Khan and parts of Punjab.

Police reportedly restricted movement in certain areas and made limited arrests. Provincial authorities have not released comprehensive figures.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Khan’s party, called for transparent implementation of the court’s directives and “unrestricted access to qualified specialists of his choice.”

The party, which emerged as the single largest bloc in the 2024 general election but alleges widespread rigging, says its leader’s medical condition underscores broader political victimization. The government and coalition partners deny those allegations.

Human Rights Concerns

The case raises questions under international human rights law, particularly regarding:

• Access to adequate medical care for detainees

• Judicial transparency and enforceability of court directives

• Freedom of peaceful assembly amid protest restrictions

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Pakistan is a party, detainees must be treated with humanity and dignity and provided appropriate medical care.

Rights groups say independent medical evaluation and transparent judicial documentation are critical safeguards in politically sensitive detention cases.

Broader Political Context

Khan’s arrest in May 2023 triggered nationwide protests against the military establishment. A subsequent crackdown targeted PTI leaders and supporters.

With new protests underway, analysts say the scale of mobilization — particularly in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province — may determine whether the situation escalates into a broader political confrontation.

For now, the dispute centers on one key question: whether the former prime minister will receive independent medical assessment under a clear, written judicial order.

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s response to a recent suicide bombing in the capital has drawn mounting criticism from opposition figures, independent journalists, and civil society groups, amid allegations of information suppression, misdirected blame, and official insensitivity during a period of national mourning.

A suicide blast in Islamabad was reported earlier this week. The government initially released an official figure of 33 casualties, but no further updates or detailed breakdowns were provided afterward.

Critics allege that following the release of the initial figure, the government moved to remove the blast from national media coverage, leading to the story rapidly disappearing from television news cycles. The government has not publicly explained the reduction in coverage.

According to accounts circulating on social media, the Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), Islamabad, had initially begun sharing updates about the blast on X (formerly Twitter). These posts were later removed, which critics allege occurred under government direction. Authorities have not confirmed or denied this claim.

Several journalists and commentators further allege that the federal government instructed television news channels not to continue broadcasting the blast-related news. The Ministry of Information has not publicly addressed these allegations.

As coverage of the incident faded, questions emerged online about why reports of a major terrorism attack had vanished from Pakistani media, with some users asking whether the state was attempting to shield or downplay the terrorism threat.

Security Failure Dispute

The Minister of State for Interior, Talal Chaudhry, and Information Minister Ata Tarar stated that the incident did not constitute a security failure.

Opposition figures strongly dispute this characterization, arguing that a successful suicide attack reflects failures in intelligence, policing, or preventive security. Instead of acknowledging institutional lapses, critics say the central government responded with what they described as an unserious approach, publicly assigning responsibility for terrorism to the opposition rather than examining agency failures.

Ata Tarar alleged that the resurgence of terrorism was linked to Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), a claim made without presenting evidence.

Long-Standing Allegations and Public Anger in KP

PTI leaders have for nearly four years alleged that elements within the military establishment facilitated or allowed the resettlement of militant groups inside Pakistan.

However, analysts and local observers note that similar perceptions exist among segments of the public in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), where renewed militant violence has fueled anger toward the military and successive federal governments led by Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).

Basant Celebrations Amid Mourning

Despite the security incident, Basant celebrations were held in parts of Punjab, including appearances by senior political figures.

Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who has served three terms, was seen participating in Basant festivities shortly after the Islamabad blast, drawing criticism from sections of the public who said the celebrations were inappropriate while victims were being mourned.

Opposition voices argue that official and semi-official celebrations should have been postponed or suspended as a mark of respect.

Timing, Cost, and Economic Pressure

Basant traditionally marks the arrival of spring, but critics allege the festival was held early, during winter, to divert attention from planned protests on 8 February.

The government is alleged to have spent around $28–29 million on Basant-related events. The figure has not been independently verified, and authorities have not released an official expenditure breakdown.

The criticism comes amid severe economic strain, with Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves estimated at around $4 billion. Of this, $2 billion provided by the United Arab Emirates has been rolled over for only one month, according to publicly available financial disclosures.

Broader Political Context

Opposition parties and rights advocates argue that civilian authorities operate under strong military influence, claiming that security failures are obscured while political blame is redirected. The government and military leadership deny political interference and maintain that institutions are functioning within constitutional limits.

ISLAMABAD/PESHAWAR, Jan 25 — Around 80,000 people have fled Pakistan’s Tirah Valley in the northwest ahead of a Jan. 25 military deadline to clear the area, local officials and residents said, despite federal government denials that any evacuation orders were issued.

The displacement follows preparations for a new security operation in Tirah, part of Khyber district near the Afghan border, an area authorities say is partially under the control of Pakistani Taliban fighters. The valley has an estimated population of about 150,000, or roughly 30,000 to 37,000 households.

Pakistan’s Ministry of Information said in a statement late on Saturday that “no order has been given to evacuate Tirah Valley” and that security agencies were conducting “intelligence-based actions” against militants, adding that civilians were not being affected.

The statement came as videos showing families, including children, leaving snow-covered villages circulated widely on social media, and as international media, including Al Jazeera, reported that thousands of families were being forced to leave ahead of a planned security sweep.

Local officials said residents were asked to leave by Jan. 25 as troops prepared to move into parts of the valley. Many families travelled for days through mountainous terrain amid heavy snowfall, reporting shortages of food, water and shelter.

At least two children died on Jan. 22 when a vehicle carrying displaced families skidded into a ravine during snowstorms, according to local authorities. Residents also reported cases of children falling ill and deaths linked to exposure to extreme cold during the journey.

Each displaced family is receiving around 250,000 Pakistani rupees (about $900) to cover basic needs for two months, officials said.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Sohail Afridi said the provincial government had allocated 4 billion rupees on Dec. 26, 2025, for what it described as “anticipated temporary movement” of residents, but stressed that the funds were meant for humanitarian support, not for any military operation.

Afridi said he had never supported the operation and had refused requests to convene a provincial Apex Committee meeting to approve it. “Decisions imposed by the barrel of a gun do not bring peace,” he said in recent remarks, questioning the effectiveness of past military campaigns in the province.

The chief minister said at least 22 military operations had been conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa over the past two decades without delivering lasting stability. He also complained of federal interference in civilian matters, saying delays and checks in the registration process by federal institutions, including NADRA, had caused hardship for displaced families.

Displaced residents described losing livelihoods and facing dangerous conditions. “My shop is gone, my income is gone,” said Saeed Khan, who left Tirah with his family. Another resident, Ihsanullah, said his child died after security restrictions delayed access to medical help.

Tirah has seen repeated cycles of displacement, marking the third major exodus in about 13 years. The area was declared cleared of militants in 2019, but fighters later returned, officials said. Pakistan has conducted more than 22 counterinsurgency operations nationwide since 2001.

The Pakistani Taliban, or TTP, has intensified attacks since 2021, following the Afghan Taliban’s return to power in Kabul. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of allowing militants to operate from its soil, a charge Kabul denies.

Human rights groups have raised concerns over the timing of the operation during harsh winter conditions. Médecins Sans Frontières said it was providing limited medical support through mobile clinics, while Amnesty International and Pakistan’s Human Rights Commission have called for investigations into the displacement. No United Nations mission has so far announced a formal response.

Leaders of the PTI, including former prime minister Imran Khan and former human rights minister Shireen Mazari, have said that during the tenure of former army chief Gen. Qamar Javed Bajwa, senior military officials discussed or facilitated the resettlement of Pakistani Taliban fighters and their families in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including tribal areas. Mazari said in a 2023 television interview that such proposals were raised in meetings after 2021 as part of attempts to negotiate with militants.

PTI leaders argue that these policies contributed to the militants’ return and the current security crisis, a claim the military has not accepted. No declassified official documents have been made public to substantiate the allegations.

Analysts say the latest operation risks deepening mistrust between local communities and the military backed central government, as conflicting accounts from federal authorities, provincial leaders and international media continue to fuel uncertainty over events unfolding in Tirah.

ISLAMABAD — A debate in Pakistan over proposals to remove citizens aged 18 to 25 from the voters’ rolls is being viewed by critics and political analysts as part of a broader effort by the country’s military establishment to push former prime minister Imran Khan out of the political landscape.

The proposal, which has surfaced amid Khan’s continued incarceration and legal challenges, has triggered concern among opposition figures who argue that restricting younger voters would disproportionately weaken Khan’s electoral base, which has historically drawn strong support from younger demographics.

Age-wise data from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) suggests that excluding voters aged 18 to 25 would remove around 24.7 million voters from the electoral process. At the time the data was compiled roughly a year ago, Pakistan had about 130.1 million registered voters — a figure that has since increased by approximately 6 million.

According to the same data, voters aged between 18 and 45 made up around 87 million, or about 67% of the electorate. Even if the 18–25 age group were excluded, the remaining electorate would still total approximately 103.5 million voters.

Of those, voters aged 26 to 45 would number around 62.3 million, accounting for about 60% of the remaining voters, while those aged 46 and above would make up roughly 40%.

Analysts say the figures show that removing younger voters would not fundamentally alter the dominance of younger and middle-aged voters in Pakistan’s elections. Instead, they argue, such a move would primarily serve political objectives rather than electoral reform.

Opposition voices contend that the discussion fits into a wider pattern of measures — including legal cases, party restrictions, and limitations on campaigning — aimed at marginalising Khan and his party ahead of future elections.

The military establishment denies involvement in politics and says it supports the constitutional process. Government officials have not publicly endorsed any proposal to amend voting eligibility.

Critics, however, argue that even if younger voters were excluded, disputes over election management and result compilation would persist, raising further questions about the credibility of the electoral process.

Pakistan’s political instability is often discussed in diplomatic circles as a problem of weak civilian institutions, corruption, or personality-driven politics. Far less candidly acknowledged is the enduring role of the military establishment and its senior leadership in undermining constitutional governance, manipulating civilian authority, and normalizing impunity. The lived experience recorded by Saeed Mehdi—a former senior Pakistani bureaucrat—offers a rare insider account that exposes the structural mechanics of this imbalance.

These are not ideological claims. They are firsthand observations, corroborated by historical outcomes, judicial records, and state behavior.

Moral Courage at the Margins, Complicity at the Center

During Pakistan’s periods of martial law, accountability was selectively weaponized. Saeed Mehdi recounts a martial law inquiry against the Commissioner of Multan. While former subordinates testified against him, two celebrated refused to incriminate him, despite pressure.

This episode highlights a recurring paradox in Pakistan: moral courage has often emerged from society’s margins, while elites—bureaucratic, judicial, and military—have repeatedly failed basic ethical tests.

Judicial Validation of Military Power

After General Pervez Musharraf’s coup in October 1999, Pakistan’s superior judiciary once again legitimized unconstitutional rule. Saeed Mehdi recalls witnessing former Chief Justice Irshad Hasan Khan actively seeking favor with General Mahmood Ahmed, a central figure in the coup.

This same judiciary validated the military takeover and granted the general authority to amend the Constitution—mirroring an earlier precedent when Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq legitimized General Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorship.

For foreign partners advocating rule of law, this pattern matters: Pakistan’s democratic erosion has not occurred through military force alone, but through judicial endorsement of unconstitutional power.

How Zia-ul-Haq Was Chosen—and What It Reveals

Saeed Mehdi’s account of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Multan visit reveals how personal subservience, not merit or institutional process, shaped Pakistan’s most consequential military appointments. Then–Lieutenant General Zia-ul-Haq waited hours into the night for Bhutto without complaint, famously stating he had been ordered to come, not to leave.

Bhutto reportedly concluded from this behavior that Zia was the appropriate choice for Army Chief—a decision that ultimately led to Bhutto’s overthrow and execution.

For external observers, this anecdote illustrates how Pakistan’s military culture rewards obedience upward, not constitutional restraint.

Execution, Hypocrisy, and Institutional Deceit

On the day Bhutto was executed, General Zia-ul-Haq publicly expressed personal sorrow while privately ensuring the sentence was carried out. The performance of piety—offering prayers after confirming the execution—stands in stark contrast to the irreversible act itself.

Bhutto’s refusal to seek mercy, documented by Saeed Mehdi, further underscores the moral asymmetry between an elected leader and the general who presided over his death while claiming helplessness before the courts he controlled.

Kargil: Strategic Recklessness Without Civilian Consent

Perhaps most relevant to international policymakers is the account of the 1999 Kargil conflict. According to Saeed Mehdi, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was not informed of the operation. Neither were most Corps Commanders, nor the Navy and Air Force chiefs.

India’s Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee informed Sharif of the operation—an extraordinary reversal of civil-military norms. Subsequent briefings by General Musharraf reportedly avoided the most basic legal question: who authorized the operation?

When the conflict spiraled, Nawaz Sharif sought U.S. intervention, meeting President Bill Clinton on July 4, 1999. A ceasefire followed, restoring previous positions. Instead of accountability, the military establishment propagated a narrative blaming civilians for a failure rooted in unauthorized military adventurism.

This episode is not merely historical. It demonstrates how nuclear-armed escalation decisions were taken outside civilian oversight—a fact with direct relevance to international security stakeholders.

Saeed Mehdi argues that Musharraf should have been removed immediately after Kargil. That window passed. By October 12, the general had consolidated power. Shakespeare’s warning about missed tides applies here: delayed civilian action enabled another decade of military dominance.

The Structural Reality Facing Pakistan Today

This is not ancient history, nor a closed chapter. Under General Asim Munir and the current military establishment, the same institutional patterns have intensified—military dominance over civilian decision-making, judicial accommodation following the 26th and 27th constitutional amendments, narrative control, and the systematic marginalization of democratic accountability. These dynamics are most visible in the political engineering directed against Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the continued incarceration and political exclusion of Imran Khan.

Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, envisioned a constitutional, civilian-led state governed by the rule of law. The repeated subversion of that vision—now reinforced through constitutional manipulation and coercive state power—has produced chronic instability that no amount of security cooperation or financial assistance can resolve.

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s political tensions are escalating again as the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) moves toward street mobilisation, amid deepening military involvement in politics and election engineering, while the military-backed government struggles to revive stalled dialogue.

The latest flashpoint has emerged in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where Chief Minister Sohail Afridi has taken a public role in mobilising supporters, portraying the push as resistance to what many Pakistanis describe as military influence over the political system. Supporters say the movement reflects growing public anger over military-backed governance, economic decline and restrictions on political participation following the 2022 change of government, which PTI leaders and supporters have linked to the removal of Imran Khan after a diplomatic cable involving then army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa and U.S. official Donald Lu.

Street pressure builds

PTI supporters say attempts were made by the military establishment to limit Chief Minister Sohail Afridi’s public outreach in sensitive areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, citing security concerns and administrative obstacles. Afridi proceeded with the engagements, later drawing large crowds across several districts. Party officials have described the gatherings as a display of political momentum at a time when formal political avenues remain constrained.

Political analysts say street mobilisation has become PTI’s primary source of pressure after repeated efforts at dialogue with the ruling coalition failed. They note that PTI leaders reject negotiations on the grounds that the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) lack an independent electoral mandate due to the military’s role in political management — a conclusion echoed in assessments by international observers, including the European Union’s election observation mission following Pakistan’s 2024 vote. Analysts add that sustained protest movements in Pakistan typically depend on strong local organisation and at least tacit tolerance from security agencies — conditions that remain uncertain.

May 9 Cases Block Political Dialogue

Efforts to revive political dialogue have repeatedly faltered, with the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-N offering talks to Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf since late 2024 but failing to bridge fundamental differences. PTI insisted that any negotiations be preceded by concrete steps, including independent judicial commissions to investigate the May 9, 2023 violence, the release of political prisoners, and unrestricted access to jailed former prime minister Imran Khan. Those conditions were not met, and multiple rounds of talks ended without agreement. Opposition figures say the collapse reflects a deeper structural issue, arguing that civilian leaders lack the authority to make binding political decisions, while government officials maintain the talks failed due to irreconcilable positions.

The May 9 cases remain central to the deadlock. Khan has been in custody since 2023 in cases ranging from corruption to charges linked to unrest following protests in which military installations were attacked. Authorities describe the prosecutions as national security matters, while PTI maintains they are politically driven. Khan has repeatedly called for an independent judicial inquiry and the public release of CCTV footage from the incidents, alleging the footage was removed and that those responsible orchestrated the violence. Nearly three years later, no independent investigation has been launched, courts have upheld multiple indictments, and appeals remain pending.

Debate Over Youth Vote Fuels Power Fears

Adding to tensions is a growing debate over proposals to alter electoral rules, including raising the voting age from 18 to 25 — a move that many observers say reflects deep anxiety within Pakistan’s deep state and military establishment over youth participation. Analysts argue that young voters overwhelmingly support Imran Khan and that a large-scale youth turnout would fundamentally disrupt the political order built and sustained over decades by the military establishment. In this view, restricting the youth vote is seen not as electoral reform but as an effort to shield an entrenched power structure from collapse. While no legislation has been introduced, the debate itself has reinforced perceptions of election engineering and heightened concerns that democratic participation is being deliberately curtailed.

A familiar cycle

Analysts say Pakistan appears trapped in a recurring pattern: a jailed opposition leader commanding popular support, a government facing questions over its mandate, and a military institution accused — again — of shaping political outcomes from behind the scenes.

Whether the confrontation shifts back to negotiations or escalates into sustained street protest will depend on how far mobilisation spreads and whether political authority is allowed to operate independently of security influence.

For now, the stalemate holds — and the distance between the street and the state continues to widen.

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s military spokesman on Tuesday issued direct political statements during a lengthy press conference, prompting criticism from opposition figures and legal experts, who said the remarks once again underscored the military’s direct involvement in Pakistan’s politics.

Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (DG ISPR), used the briefing to accuse former prime minister Imran Khan and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), of encouraging instability and maintaining links to violent elements, according to excerpts circulated by state media.

The press conference, which lasted more than three hours, went beyond the military’s traditional remit of operational and security matters, addressing issues ranging from internal party governance within PTI to ongoing court cases involving opposition leaders.

Political reactions

Senior opposition figures reacted sharply, saying the military spokesman’s comments amounted to political interference.

Former federal minister Javed Hashmi said the briefing showed the military was continuing what he described as “political operations under the cover of security messaging,” adding that past counterterrorism campaigns had failed to deliver lasting stability despite repeated military operations.

Leaders from PTI also issued a written response, rejecting the allegations and accusing the military of attempting to shift responsibility for Pakistan’s security challenges onto political opponents. The party said linking PTI to militancy was a “recycled narrative” used to justify crackdowns on dissent.

Legal concerns over sub judice matters

The press conference has also drawn scrutiny from legal circles after the DG ISPR displayed social media posts and photographs of opposition figures, including lawyer and activist Iman Mazari, whose cases are currently under trial.

Mazari’s legal team told the court that the military spokesman’s remarks prejudiced judicial proceedings, arguing that the statements constituted commentary on sub judice matters by a senior state official. Lawyers requested the court to summon the DG ISPR to substantiate the allegations made during the briefing.

The judge deferred the request, placing the petition on hold until later stages of the trial, according to court officials.

Military operations and internal security

During the briefing, the military’s spokesman defended the armed forces’ counterterrorism strategy, saying decisions on security operations were taken in the national interest. He said the military had conducted dozens of large-scale operations and thousands of targeted actions against militant groups over the past decade.

Political leaders from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, however, said repeated security operations had imposed significant social and economic costs on local communities. They accused authorities of excluding elected representatives and tribal elders from key decision-making processes.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Sohail Afridi said any future security policy should be formulated through consultation with provincial stakeholders to ensure sustainable peace. He also questioned the effectiveness of continued military operations, arguing that if more than 14,000 operations had failed to bring lasting peace, there was no clear guarantee that further operations would succeed.

Analysts said the tone and substance of the press conference reflected growing tensions in Pakistan’s civil–military landscape.

“The military spokesman is increasingly addressing political narratives directly, which raises questions about institutional boundaries,” said one Islamabad-based constitutional expert, speaking on condition of anonymity. “In most democracies, such disputes would be left to civilian authorities and courts.”

The military has rejected accusations of political interference in the past, saying it supports constitutional order and internal stability.

Broader political backdrop

The press conference comes amid heightened political tension in Pakistan, where former prime minister Imran Khan remains in custody and has been held in isolation, and where military authorities have refused to allow his sister to meet him despite a court order. Several senior leaders of his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), have also recently received lengthy prison sentences in cases linked to protests and unrest last year.

The United Nations and international human rights organisations have raised concerns over restrictions on political activity, Khan’s continued detention, curbs on media freedoms, and the alleged use of military courts or military influence in civilian legal processes.

News Summary:

Islamabad - Pakistan has completed the long-delayed privatization of its national carrier, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), in a deal the government has described as transparent and reform-driven, but which critics say reflects deep fiscal distress, weak investor confidence, and the expanding role of military-linked capital in the country’s economy.

The airline was sold for 135 billion Pakistani rupees ($450 million) to a local consortium led by the Arif Habib Group following a live, televised bidding process. The government retained a 25% stake, with the buyer holding an option to acquire the remainder within a year at a premium.

No international airline or foreign strategic investor participated in the bidding.

From Regional Pioneer to Fiscal Burden

Founded in 1955, PIA was among Asia’s earliest national airlines and remained profitable for nearly four decades. Through the 1960s, 1970s, and much of the 1980s, it operated as a regional pioneer, supplying technical staff and training that later helped establish airlines such as Emirates and Singapore Airlines.

Industry analysts and former executives date PIA’s structural decline to the early 1990s, when successive governments began using the airline for political hiring, allocating routes based on patronage rather than profitability, and imposing price controls that distorted commercial decision-making.

Public audit records and parliamentary reports show that by the late 1990s, PIA had become chronically loss-making, requiring repeated government bailouts.

How Political Hiring Broke the Airline

A review of parliamentary proceedings, auditor-general findings and aviation data shows that PIA’s deterioration followed a pattern common to several state-owned enterprises in Pakistan.

In the mid-1980s, PIA operated roughly 45–50 aircraft with an estimated 18,000–20,000 employees, producing an employee-to-aircraft ratio of about 400:1, broadly in line with global norms at the time.

That balance shifted after 1989, following Pakistan’s return to competitive civilian politics.

Between 1989 and 1993, under the first civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, hiring accelerated in clerical, ground-handling and non-technical roles, often based on political recommendations rather than operational need. By 1993, analysts estimate staff numbers had risen to 23,000–25,000, with little change in fleet size.

The trend intensified between 1993 and 1999, when contract and temporary workers were widely regularised ahead of elections and politically aligned unions gained influence over management. By the late 1990s, PIA employed more than 30,000 staff for a fleet of 40–45 aircraft, pushing the employee-to-aircraft ratio to 650–750:1.

After the 1999 Musharraf military takeover, large-scale political hiring slowed but was not reversed. Workforce reductions were avoided due to political and social resistance, and losses continued to be absorbed by the state.

The most damaging phase came after 2008, under successive governments of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Employee numbers peaked at 45,000–50,000, while operational aircraft fell below 35, many grounded for maintenance. The employee-to-aircraft ratio exceeded 1,000:1.

For comparison, major international full-service airlines typically operate with 150–250 employees per aircraft.

“No airline can survive with that cost structure,” said a former civil aviation regulator. “By that point, the losses were built in.”

Losses Socialised, Assets Sold

By the 2010s, PIA required repeated government bailouts to meet payroll and debt obligations. Auditor-general reports show cumulative losses running into hundreds of billions of rupees, largely absorbed through sovereign guarantees.

Despite multiple reform attempts, no government pursued large-scale restructuring, citing labour unrest and political fallout.

Fleet Value and the Price Debate

PIA currently lists 34–38 aircraft on its books, though only 18–20 are operational, according to aviation tracking data and company disclosures.

Industry pricing databases show that in today’s secondary market:

• Used Boeing 777-200/300ER aircraft typically trade between $20–40 million,

• Airbus A320-family aircraft between $15–30 million,

• ATR turboprops between $5–10 million.

On a conservative basis, analysts estimate PIA’s operational fleet value at $350–500 million, before factoring in landing slots at major airports, bilateral air service rights with more than 90 countries, brand value, and ground infrastructure.

That arithmetic has fueled debate over whether $450 million fully reflects the airline’s underlying assets, even excluding hotels and real estate that were retained by the state.

Why Foreign Investors Stayed Away

After the privatization of PIA, contradictory statements emerged from within the government itself.

Some government officials argued that Pakistan’s aviation market failed to attract foreign airlines due to regulatory complexity and PIA’s long history of losses, suggesting that the absence of international bidders was structural rather than political.

However, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif offered a sharply different interpretation, saying the privatization of PIA demonstrated growing confidence by foreign investors in the Pakistani government, a claim that stood in contrast to the exclusively domestic nature of the bidding process.

Independent analysts point instead to broader concerns, including:

• political instability following Pakistan’s regime change,

• weak enforcement of the rule of law,

• currency volatility,

• and opaque civil–military decision-making structures.

“These deals don’t fail on valuation alone,” said a Karachi-based investment banker. “They fail on trust.”

The contrast between the privatization of Air India and Pakistan International Airlines is stark. Air India’s sale to the Tata Group transferred meaningful operational risk to the buyer, included the assumption of significant liabilities, attracted competitive bidding, and was framed around reviving a national asset. By contrast, PIA’s sale to a consortium led by the Arif Habib Group largely ring-fenced historical debt and pension obligations with the state, drew no foreign airline bidders, and delivered limited immediate fiscal relief. As a result, analysts say Air India was privatized to rebuild an airline, while PIA was privatized primarily to halt losses — with much of the burden remaining on taxpayers.

Military-Linked Capital and Strategic Gain

The winning consortium has indicated it may bring in additional partners, including entities linked to Pakistan’s military-run commercial enterprises.

Economists note that such firms stand to benefit from:

• low-risk entry into a strategic asset backed by state guarantees,

• reinvestment-only profit restrictions that limit political backlash while preserving long-term control,

• preferential access to aviation infrastructure and state contracts.

Pakistan’s armed forces already control extensive commercial interests across banking, real estate, fertilizers, and logistics, making PIA a potential extension of that portfolio rather than a conventional privatization.

Competing Narratives

Government ministers have framed the transaction as a successful reform that exceeded internal valuations and halted annual losses.

Critics, including journalist Imran Riaz Khan, argue the structure transfers future upside to the buyer while leaving liabilities — including pensions, taxes, and historical debts — with the state.

“The government sold control but kept the burden,” Khan said in a broadcast commentary.

The buyer says PIA’s potential lies in religious travel, the overseas Pakistani market, and underutilised international slots — advantages it argues governments failed to exploit due to bureaucratic constraints.

A State Under Financial Duress

Pakistan’s broader fiscal position looms over the deal. Public debt exceeds 80% of GDP, with external obligations heavily concentrated over the next five years. Islamabad remains under a multi-year stabilisation programme with the International Monetary Fund, requiring asset sales, subsidy cuts and structural reforms.

Government officials say privatization is unavoidable.

News Summary:

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s imprisoned former prime minister Imran Khan has rejected negotiations with the ruling coalition, even as the Pakistan Muslim League-N signals openness to dialogue, highlighting deepening political paralysis and renewed scrutiny of the military’s role in civilian affairs.

The government has previously issued multiple calls for talks, but political analysts say the joint administration led by the Sharif and Zardari families lacks both the electoral mandate and political authority to hold substantive negotiations with Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI). Analysts add that past offers of dialogue by successive governments were often aimed at preventing opposition-led street protests rather than addressing underlying political disputes.

During earlier contacts, PTI set conditions for negotiations, including the release of 75-year-old party leader Yasmin Rashid, who was later sentenced to 10 years in prison in cases linked to the May 9 unrest. PTI also demanded permission for senior party figures to meet Khan in custody.

According to journalist Muneeb Farooq, who is widely regarded as close to the military establishment, restrictions on meetings with Khan are not based on legal grounds but reflect a decision taken by the military.

Public statements from Khan’s family and senior figures within his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) indicate that any talks with the current government would lack his approval. His sister, Alima Khan, said those advocating negotiations did not represent Khan’s position, reiterating that the former premier had instead instructed party organisers to prepare for a street mobilisation, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

The government, led by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, has publicly suggested dialogue as a means to ease political tensions, but analysts note that the stated preconditions floated by opposition figures — including fresh elections, an inquiry into the 2024 polls, and changes to the election commission — are unlikely to be accepted by the ruling alliance.

Prison stance hardens

Imran Khan has been incarcerated since 2023 in a series of cases ranging from corruption to charges linked to unrest following protests on May 9, 2023. PTI leaders and allied commentators continue to describe the May 9 cases as politically motivated, a claim rejected by the authorities. Courts have so far upheld multiple indictments, while appeals remain pending.

Khan has repeatedly called for an independent judicial inquiry into the May 9 violence and demanded that closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage from the affected sites be made public. He has alleged that the footage was stolen, arguing that those responsible for its removal were the same actors who orchestrated the violence. Despite the passage of nearly three years, no independent investigation into the May 9 events has been conducted.

From prison, Khan has maintained a confrontational posture, rejecting calls for compromise and framing his detention as part of a broader pattern of military interference in politics — a charge Pakistan’s armed forces deny.

Military and intelligence scrutiny

Renewed debate over civil–military relations has been driven by discussion surrounding former intelligence officials and anonymous social-media activity. Commentators have pointed to the now-deactivated X (formerly Twitter) account “Ammar Solangi,” which frequently posted aggressive commentary targeting journalists, activists and judges.

Several journalists have alleged that the account had links to individuals within the security establishment, including references to senior military intelligence officer Faisal Naseer. No official confirmation has been provided, and the military has not publicly commented on the account’s operation. The account’s deactivation has intensified speculation, though the claims remain unverified.

Political analysts say that the emergence of alleged links between the Ammar Solangi account and Faisal Naseer, followed by the account’s sudden shutdown, has also fuelled perceptions of internal divisions within the military, with rival groupings engaged in behind-the-scenes power struggles. According to these analysts, Faisal Naseer is considered to be among the contenders in the race for the post of director general of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), though they say the Sharif family is opposed to his appointment.

Analysts also note that the Ammar Solangi account had been identified and discussed by multiple commentators in the past, but it was only after journalist Muneeb Farooq — who is widely seen as presenting the military’s perspective — publicly pointed to the account that it was taken offline.

Separately, analysts say the ongoing legal proceedings against former intelligence chief Faiz Hameed — whose cases could expand to include matters linked to the May 9 unrest and earlier political events — have deepened uncertainty within Pakistan’s power structure. Claims that Hameed could testify against former prime minister Imran Khan have been described by some of his alleged associates as unfounded, and no court filings to that effect are publicly available.

Broader implications

The standoff comes amid wider concerns over democratic backsliding and declining human-development indicators. According to United Nations data, Pakistan’s Human Development Index ranking has continued to fall in recent years, adding economic pressure to an already volatile political environment.

For now, Pakistan appears locked in a familiar cycle: a government facing legitimacy questions, an opposition leader wielding influence from prison, and a military establishment accused — again — of shaping outcomes. Whether this confrontation moves toward negotiation or escalates into mass protest remains uncertain.

ISLAMABAD — The cumulative prison sentences handed to Pakistan’s jailed former prime minister Imran Khan now amount to what his supporters describe as a political life term, deepening a domestic crisis that coincides with sensitive foreign-policy manoeuvring over Gaza and unusually blunt disclosures by U.S. officials.

This week, a trial court sentenced Khan and his wife Bushra Bibi to a further 17 years each in the Toshakhana-II case, taking Khan’s total sentences across multiple convictions to roughly 60–65 years. In his written verdict, the judge said he was being “lenient” due to Khan’s age and Bushra Bibi being a woman — language critics say underscores the punitive tone of the ruling rather than judicial restraint.

The case centres on a Bulgari jewellery set received from the Saudi royal family in 2021. Prosecutors argue the gift was undervalued, improperly deposited in the state Toshakhana repository, and unlawfully retained. Khan’s defence maintains he paid the officially assessed amount through the prescribed mechanism, and that if the valuation was flawed, liability rests with officials who conducted it. Lawyers also argue that the offence relied on 2023 legal amendments, applied retroactively to conduct that occurred in 2021 — a move they say violates basic principles of criminal law.

Procedural questions have further fuelled controversy. After months of adjournments, defence lawyers were informed late at night that the court would sit the next morning. Final arguments were not completed, only one defence lawyer was allowed inside the jail courtroom, and family members were barred. The judge is reported to have arrived with a pre-written 65-page judgment, read it out, and left without addressing next legal steps. Earlier observations by the Islamabad High Court had already questioned what law in force at the time made non-deposit of gifts a criminal offence — reasoning that had appeared to favour Khan.

Khan’s supporters say the case illustrates selective accountability. They point to past instances where political leaders allegedly retained state gifts or vehicles without similar prosecution, and to the military’s own opaque handling of gifts, which does not fall under Toshakhana rules. Authorities deny political targeting and insist the courts are acting independently.

From jail, Khan responded calmly, according to aides and journalists with access. He smiled on hearing the verdict, instructed his lawyers to appeal, and reiterated that his struggle was rooted in rule of law rather than personal grievance. He again drew a distinction between Pakistan’s armed forces as an institution and what he calls a small group of senior generals misusing power, warning that framing the conflict as “PTI versus the army” would only entrench those at the top.

That warning has gained traction as domestic repression increasingly intersects with foreign-policy disclosures. Several journalists and analysts who closely track Pakistan’s civil–military relations say the removal of former prime minister Imran Khan was driven in part by strategic disagreements with Washington, including his government’s refusal to align with the Abraham Accords framework and its resistance to granting the United States expanded military basing or access arrangements in Pakistan. A Reuters report earlier said Pakistan had offered to contribute troops to a proposed post-war stabilisation force in Gaza. The issue escalated when U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during a press briefing, stated publicly that Pakistan itself had initiated the offer — a disclosure that contradicted the Pakistani government’s initial efforts to downplay or blur the report, and underscored claims by Khan’s supporters that foreign-policy realignment played a role in the regime-change operation against him.

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Subsequently, senior ruling-party Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group (PMLN) figure Rana Sanaullah confirmed that army chief Asim Munir was on a foreign tour that included the United States, undercutting earlier Foreign Office claims that no such engagement was taking place. Analysts say Rubio’s remarks effectively exposed the military leadership’s role in quiet coordination with Washington, bypassing civilian transparency.

Against this backdrop, critics argue the unusually severe sentencing of Khan — amounting in aggregate to a lifetime behind bars — serves a dual purpose: neutralising the country’s most popular political challenger while smoothing the path for sensitive external alignments by minimising domestic resistance. Some commentators have linked the timing and severity of the judgments to efforts to consolidate authority as Pakistan positions itself as a security partner in a volatile Middle East, including Gaza. The military denies any connection between domestic legal cases and foreign policy.

Religious and ideological messaging has also shifted. Senior clerics have issued carefully calibrated statements supporting Gaza’s reconstruction while rejecting any role in disarming Palestinian resistance — positions critics describe as scripted to balance domestic sentiment with international expectations. They note that Pakistan’s establishment has repeatedly reshaped its ideological posture over decades, from Cold War ally to jihad-era partner to contemporary strategic collaborator, depending on geopolitical need.

For Khan’s supporters, the Toshakhana-II verdict is not an isolated legal outcome but part of a broader strategy of political neutralisation: compressed trials, retroactive laws, selective enforcement and information control at home, paired with strategic repositioning abroad. The risk, they warn, is deepening polarisation and erosion of the rule of law — while public anger is redirected away from individual decision-makers and toward institutions themselves, a dynamic Khan has repeatedly cautioned against.

ISLAMABAD/WASHINGTON — Pakistan’s offer to contribute troops to a proposed multinational stabilization force in Gaza has brought into sharp focus the country’s dual-track strategy: projecting cooperation abroad while tightening political and security controls at home.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said this week that Pakistan had offered to participate in a post-war security force for Gaza, adding that Washington was reviewing the proposal and working through issues related to mandate, procedures and rules of engagement.

“We’re grateful to those countries, including Pakistan, that have offered troops,” Rubio told reporters in Washington, saying discussions were continuing over authorization and operational parameters.

The remarks publicly confirmed Pakistan’s willingness to engage in a U.S.-backed security framework tied to Gaza — a disclosure that contrasted with more cautious statements from Islamabad, where officials have said no final decision has been taken.

From pressure claims to proactive offer

Until recently, Pakistani officials and allied media had suggested that Army Chief Asim Munir was under pressure from the United States to deploy Pakistani troops to Gaza. However, recent statements by U.S. officials have clarified that no such coercion was applied. Instead, Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership, including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, had proactively offered the services of the Pakistani army as part of a proposed multinational force, a move analysts say was aimed at securing external support amid mounting domestic political and legal challenges.

External signalling

Security analysts say Rubio’s comments effectively clarified that Pakistan’s role was not the result of coercion but of an offer, aimed at reinforcing the military leadership’s standing with Washington at a time of regional instability and economic pressure.

Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is expected to engage U.S. military counterparts in discussions focused on regional security coordination, according to officials familiar with the matter. Diplomats say Pakistan’s army is viewed as an acceptable contributor to a stabilization force, amid Israeli reservations about the involvement of some regional militaries.

Such engagement, analysts say, serves as external validation for Pakistan’s military leadership, strengthening its diplomatic leverage with Western partners.

Domestic containment

At home, however, the Gaza discussions have coincided with a sharp escalation in legal action against political opponents, particularly the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).

On Friday, an anti-terrorism court handed down 10-year prison sentences to several senior opposition figures in cases linked to violence following unrest on May 9, 2023. Those convicted included former Punjab health minister Yasmin Rashid, Senator Ejaz Chaudhry, former provincial minister Mian Mahmood Rashid, and former Punjab governor Umar Sarfaraz Cheema.

Former foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi was acquitted in one case, with the court citing his absence from Lahore during the unrest.

The opposition PTI, led by jailed former prime minister Imran Khan, has described the prosecutions as politically motivated. The government denies interference in judicial proceedings.

Why the two tracks intersect

Analysts say the timing of the verdicts is not incidental. Any Pakistani military role in Gaza risks triggering domestic backlash in a country where public sympathy for Palestinians is strong and suspicion of cooperation with U.S.- or Israel-linked initiatives runs deep.

To manage that risk, they say, the state has moved to pre-empt mass mobilisation by neutralising opposition leadership and signalling zero tolerance for street protests.

“The external message is reliability and control,” said one Islamabad-based analyst. “The internal message is deterrence.”

Recent security actions against religious groups, including confrontations involving Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) near Muridke earlier this year, are also seen as part of the same strategy — demonstrating the state’s capacity to suppress unrest that could complicate sensitive foreign policy decisions.

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Political implications

Together, the Gaza diplomacy and domestic crackdown illustrate how Pakistan’s civil-military leadership is synchronizing foreign engagement with internal enforcement.

Externally, cooperation with Washington bolsters international legitimacy and strategic relevance. Internally, court verdicts, policing, and legal pressure limit the ability of opposition forces to challenge decisions made at the security level.

Whether Pakistan ultimately deploys troops to Gaza remains uncertain. What is clearer, analysts say, is that the leadership is consolidating authority at home precisely as it seeks to expand strategic alignment abroad — a linkage that underscores the shrinking space between foreign policy and domestic politics in Pakistan.

News Summary:

ISLAMABAD/WASHINGTON — Pakistan has indicated its willingness to contribute troops to a proposed international stabilization force for Gaza, according to statements by senior U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a move that underscores Islamabad’s alignment with a U.S.-backed post-war security framework for the territory.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said this week that Pakistan had offered to take part in a multinational force aimed at maintaining security in Gaza following the Israel–Hamas conflict, adding that Washington was reviewing the proposal and working through issues related to mandate, procedures and rules of engagement. Speaking to reporters in Washington, Rubio said: “We’re grateful to those countries, including Pakistan, that have offered troops. We are still working through the framework, including rules of engagement and authorization.”

His remarks followed earlier comments by U.S. President Donald Trump, who said Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir had supported his Gaza plan “from the beginning,” comments that appeared to contrast with statements by Pakistani officials that no final decision had been taken.

Neither the Pakistani government nor the military has publicly denied Trump’s statement. Neither the Pakistani government nor the military has publicly denied Trump’s statement. Pakistani ministers have appeared on television offering alternative explanations or broader narratives, but none has directly rejected the claim attributed to the U.S. president. Similarly, the military’s spokesperson, DG ISPR Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, has held multiple political press conferences criticizing former prime minister Imran Khan and his party, yet has not issued a denial of Trump’s remarks. Some local analysts say Pakistan’s military, supported by allied religious political groups, has sought to reassure a domestic audience broadly sympathetic to the Palestinian cause that Islamabad is not planning to deploy troops to Gaza.

Trump’s Gaza proposal, announced on Nov. 5 2025, outlines a security arrangement involving foreign troops tasked with maintaining order, disarming Hamas and preventing attacks on Israel. The plan does not explicitly reference the establishment of a Palestinian state, a key demand of Hamas and much of the Palestinian leadership.

Hamas rejected core elements of the proposal on Nov. 14 2025, saying it would not agree to disarm or relinquish control of Gaza without a political settlement guaranteeing Palestinian statehood. Public opinion surveys conducted in October showed Hamas retaining significant support in Gaza despite months of conflict.

Despite Hamas’s rejection, the United Nations Security Council passed a U.S.-backed resolution on Nov. 17 2025 authorizing an international stabilization force. Pakistan voted in favour of the resolution, while Russia and China abstained.

Analysts say the proposed force would effectively assume security duties currently carried out by Israeli forces, including border protection and internal policing, while safeguarding reconstruction efforts. Funding for the force is expected to be coordinated by the United States, according to diplomats familiar with the discussions.

Domestic political strain adds complexity to Pakistan’s foreign policy choices

The developments come against a backdrop of heightened political tension in Pakistan, where former Prime Minister Imran Khan remains in custody and several senior figures from his party have recently been handed 10 to 17 years lengthy prison sentences. Khan was removed from office in 2022 following a no-confidence vote, a process his supporters describe as a regime-change operation influenced by foreign pressure.

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Khan has previously said his government resisted U.S. policy demands, including requests related to military basing and participation in the Abraham Accords. Local analysts say the subsequent political realignment, which brought the current civil–military leadership to power alongside the Sharif-led government, reflected a convergence with U.S. strategic priorities. Human rights organisations have raised concerns over restrictions on political activity, media freedoms, and access to legal processes during the crackdown on opposition figures.

For now, Islamabad has not detailed the scale or terms of any potential troop deployment to Gaza. U.S. officials said discussions were ongoing and no final decision had been made.

Article Summary:

Analysts monitoring civil–military relations and diplomatic developments in Pakistan assess that forthcoming engagement in Washington involving U.S. President Trump and lifetime immunity holder army chief Asim Munir is being closely scrutinized, as it coincides with a U.S.-backed effort to operationalize a post-war Gaza security and stabilization framework. Observers note that this channel has increasingly prioritized direct coordination with Pakistan’s military leadership, raising the decision-making stakes for Asim Munir amid economic constraints and domestic political volatility.

The proposal: a Muslim-majority “stabilization force” for Gaza

Independent political analysts describe the core concept as a multinational force—drawn primarily from Muslim-majority countries—intended to establish a buffer/stabilization presence in Gaza. In this framing, the mission’s practical effect would be to reduce direct exposure and security risk for Israel by inserting third-party forces into the post-conflict governance and security environment. Commentators emphasize that the most contentious operational question is not reconstruction itself, but whether the arrangement implicitly requires containment, dismantling, or “disarmament” of Hamas—an element widely seen as politically toxic for participating states and inherently escalatory on the ground.

Regional reaction: refusals narrow the pool of viable contributors

Analysts monitoring civil–military relations and diplomatic developments in Pakistan assess that forthcoming engagement in Washington involving U.S. President Trump and lifetime immunity holder Army Chief Asim Munir is being closely scrutinized, as it coincides with a U.S.-backed effort to operationalize a post-war Gaza security and stabilization framework. Observers note that this channel has increasingly prioritized direct coordination with Pakistan’s military leadership, raising the decision-making stakes for Asim Munir amid economic constraints and domestic political volatility. Both Indonesia and Pakistan’s Asim–Sharif–Zardari regime face allegations of corruption and human rights violations.

Why Pakistan is a focal point: leverage, incentives, and coercive trade-offs

Commentators assess that Pakistan’s strategic calculus is being shaped by a transactional pressure dynamic: compliance delivers external support, while refusal triggers diplomatic and economic costs. Analysts point to incentives that are routinely extended in return for such alignment, including smoother engagement with international financial institutions, reduced friction in Western diplomatic channels, and sustained political backing for Islamabad’s current governing architecture. In parallel, experts argue that participation results in a marked reduction in international scrutiny of Pakistan’s domestic political environment—including the deliberate overlooking of human rights violations and the military’s open involvement in politics—with contentious governance practices and rights-related criticism effectively set aside, particularly when Pakistan is viewed as facilitating a major U.S. security objective.

More: Does Pakistan’s Most Powerful Army Chief, Asim Munir, Have Room to Resist U.S. Pressure on Israel’s Security?

Operational risks: rules of engagement, Israel–Hamas friction, and domestic blowback

Security-focused analysts warn that any Pakistan deployment would face three immediate hazards:

• Israel–force friction: A foreign contingent operating alongside Israeli forces would likely face strict rules limiting its ability to respond to Israeli actions. Analysts argue this creates a credibility trap: troops may be exposed to confrontation without meaningful agency to respond, increasing reputational and morale risks.

• Hamas containment/disarmament dynamics: Analysts emphasize that attempts to disarm or forcibly constrain an entrenched armed actor are not administrative tasks; they are inherently coercive and risk producing direct clashes. Commentators argue a troop presence could be drawn into active conflict rather than “stabilization.”

• Domestic political repercussions: Observers underline that Pakistani public sentiment remains strongly pro-Palestinian, and any perception that Pakistani troops are facilitating an Israel-centered security architecture could trigger significant domestic backlash, including mobilization across religious and anti-establishment constituencies. In this context, military agencies have worked intensively in recent weeks to align a Military–Mullah (Islamic scholar) alliance, projecting Asim Munir and the army as a so-called “God’s Army,” while signaling that the alliance will not tolerate dissent or public criticism of Army Chief Asim Munir and his policies. Analysts warn that these dynamics would further strain Pakistan’s already polarized political environment.

The narrowing choice set: internal stabilization versus external compliance

Political analysts conclude that Gen. Asim Munir’s decision is increasingly framed as a constrained choice between two costly tracks:

• Align externally by accommodating Washington’s Gaza framework—potentially gaining short-term diplomatic and economic relief, but importing severe domestic risk; or

• Resist and delay to reduce internal fallout—accepting potential deterioration in the bilateral relationship at a moment when Pakistan’s economic position increases dependence on external support and diplomatic cover.

Forward outlook: what will define the next phase

Experts argue the key determinant will be whether Pakistan can credibly limit any role to humanitarian logistics and reconstruction support without being operationally tasked—explicitly or implicitly—with enforcement against Palestinian factions. In the absence of a transparent legal mandate, clear command-and-control lines, and public legitimacy at home, analysts assess that any military commitment would carry outsized downside risk for Pakistan’s internal stability, civil–military balance, and regional standing.

Page Summary:

ISLAMABAD — Pakistan’s possible role in a proposed international force for Gaza has thrust the country’s powerful military leadership into an unusually stark global and domestic spotlight, intertwining Middle East diplomacy with Pakistan’s own contested political order.

The United States is pressing Pakistan to consider contributing troops to a post-war Gaza stabilization force, according to reporting by Reuters, a move that would place Islamabad within the operational architecture of President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan. The proposal comes amid an uncertain ceasefire, with analysts warning that any truce in Gaza remains fragile and vulnerable to collapse. (Reuters, Dec 17, 2025)

At the centre of this debate stands Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, whose authority at home has expanded dramatically in recent years. Reuters has described Munir as Pakistan’s most powerful military leader in decades with lifetime immunity, following constitutional and legal changes that have consolidated unprecedented control over security policy and internal stability.

But the Gaza proposal raises uncomfortable questions. Hamas has publicly rejected the idea of submitting to any foreign force operating under U.S. or Western political supervision, including frameworks associated with former British prime minister Tony Blair. If Hamas refuses to disarm or cooperate, analysts ask, would Pakistani troops be placed in a position of confrontation with a group Pakistan has historically supported diplomatically as part of the Palestinian cause?

And if the mission’s success depends on coordination with Israel or its allies, another question emerges: would Pakistan’s military find itself indirectly aligned with Israeli forces, a scenario without precedent in Islamabad’s official policy?

Strategic pressure and domestic risk

According to The Times of Israel, U.S. pressure on Pakistan to join the Gaza force is “testing the authority” of Asim Munir at home, where public opinion remains deeply sympathetic to Palestinians and hostile to perceived U.S. or Israeli influence. Any deployment decision could provoke street protests, political backlash, or further strain civil–military relations.

Indian media outlet The Times of India reports that U.S. officials view Pakistan’s participation as politically significant, warning that refusal could irritate Washington at a time when Munir is seeking to manage Pakistan’s economic crisis and external dependencies.

Yet the external pressure contrasts sharply with Western silence on Pakistan’s internal trajectory. Critics argue that while Washington confronts governments like Venezuela over democratic backsliding, it has largely muted its criticism of Pakistan’s political repression, mass arrests, and shrinking civic space.

The London Plan and regime-change allegations

This silence, critics say, is not accidental. It intersects with what Pakistani commentators describe as an advancing “London Plan” — an understanding between the military establishment and the Sharif–Zardari political families to manage power through controlled elections, media management, and legal engineering.

Within this narrative, former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s removal is portrayed as a turning point. Khan has repeatedly stated that his refusal to sign onto the Abraham Accords or to allow U.S. military bases in Pakistan placed him at odds with global strategic interests. Following his ouster, Pakistan witnessed sweeping legal cases against opposition leaders, curbs on media, and expanded military influence over civilian institutions.

In this context, frequent reference is made to the controversial diplomatic cable attributed to U.S. official Donald Lu and addressed to then army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa — a document whose contents are widely cited and which continues to shape public perception of foreign involvement in Pakistan’s political realignment.

Taken together, these developments have reinforced a growing belief among Khan’s supporters that democratic processes and human rights in Pakistan have been subordinated to global power politics.

A convergence of crises

Pakistan’s internal law-and-order situation remains fragile. Political polarization is acute, the economy is under strain, and public trust in institutions is eroding. Against this backdrop, the Gaza question risks becoming more than a foreign policy decision.

Can Pakistan justify sending troops abroad while facing unresolved legitimacy questions at home?

Will Asim Munir’s consolidated power enable strategic decisiveness — or deepen domestic alienation?

And is Western engagement with Pakistan driven by stability and peace, or by transactional silence in exchange for strategic compliance?

As Washington weighs its Gaza options and Islamabad calculates its response, Pakistan appears caught between external expectations and internal fractures, with consequences that may extend far beyond the Middle East.

Imran Khan has never been a conventional political actor. Even from prison, he continues to shape Pakistan’s political conversation in ways few leaders before him have managed. More than two years after his removal from office following a military–Sharif–Zardari regime-change operation and his subsequent incarceration, Khan remains physically absent yet politically omnipresent—an anomaly in Pakistan’s long civil–military history.

Since 2023, the former prime minister has been held in a high-security facility, facing more than a hundred legal cases ranging from corruption to charges framed as threats to national security. This is not the first time Pakistan’s military establishment has intervened directly in politics by reclassifying a civilian political leader as a security risk or an internal enemy. Historically, such labeling has functioned less as a judicial determination and more as a political tool—one that shifts dissent from the civilian arena into the security domain, where legal safeguards are weaker and exceptional measures are more easily justified.

The sheer volume of litigation has effectively immobilized Imran Khan, tying him down through continuous court proceedings, restrictions, and prolonged incarceration. Yet immobilization has not resulted in political erasure. On the contrary, confinement has amplified his symbolic power. Removed from public life but not from public consciousness, Khan has become a focal point of national anxiety, resistance narratives, and institutional confrontation.

His imprisonment has transformed him from an active political operator into a political symbol—one onto which competing interpretations of power, legitimacy, and authority are projected. For supporters, his detention reinforces the perception of a leader punished for defiance rather than wrongdoing. For the state, his continued relevance underscores the limits of coercion in neutralizing popular political figures. In this space between power and popularity, the struggle has not ended; it has merely changed form, relocating from electoral politics to prisons, courtrooms, and the broader contest over narrative control.

A Sudden Silence, and a Wave of Alarm

For months, Khan’s imprisonment followed a predictable rhythm. Weekly meetings with lawyers, family members, and party representatives functioned as a controlled channel of communication—allowing updates, messages, and political signals to trickle out. That routine abruptly ended when authorities suspended these meetings for several weeks.

more: Weekly Think-Tank Memo: Pakistan Political, Economic, and Security Review

The silence triggered an immediate reaction. Rumors spread rapidly across social media: claims of torture, deteriorating health, even death. What made the episode unusual was not just the speed of the speculation, but its reach. Concern extended beyond Khan’s core supporters to critics and political neutrals, reflecting a broader unease about the opacity of state power and the treatment of political detainees.

The military establishment and Sharif-Zrdari government eventually permitted meetings with Khan’s sisters, defusing the most extreme rumors. But the damage was done. The episode reinforced suspicions that the state had both motive and incentive to permanently neutralize a political figure it could neither co-opt nor silence.

From Political Rival to “National Security Threat”

Khan’s response was characteristically confrontational. Messages attributed to him following the meetings were sharply critical of the military leadership, singling out Army Chief General Asim Munir. Soon after, the military’s media wing convened an unusually high-profile press conference, attended by prominent journalists.

The tone marked a clear escalation. Khan was no longer framed merely as a political dissenter or convicted leader; he was explicitly labeled a national security threat. The declaration crossed a threshold. In Pakistan’s political lexicon, such framing historically precedes exceptional measures—and signals that the dispute has moved beyond politics into the domain of state security.

The rupture was not sudden, but it was consequential. After more than two decades of political struggle, Imran Khan won the 2018 general election on the back of broad public support. Faced with that mandate, the military establishment under then–Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa chose to align itself with Khan, calculating that cooperation was preferable to confrontation. That alignment, however, was conditional rather than organic. According to accounts familiar with the period, the establishment expected Khan’s government to advance strategic objectives, including Pakistan’s potential participation in the Abraham Accords. Khan’s refusal to endorse or sign onto that framework marked a decisive break. Even during the 2018 election, his party’s seat count was reportedly constrained to prevent the emergence of a civilian government strong enough to operate beyond military oversight. What followed was not an aberration but a familiar trajectory in Pakistan’s civil–military history: once strategic alignment collapsed, political accommodation gave way to estrangement, and ultimately to removal. What distinguishes Khan is not that he was imprisoned—nearly every prime minister of the past half-century has faced incarceration—but that he refused the conventional exits. He neither sought prolonged hospitalization nor negotiated exile. More critically, he declined to cut a deal.

He neither sought prolonged hospitalization nor negotiated exile. More critically, he declined to cut a deal.

Resistance as Strategy

Khan’s continued imprisonment appears, at least in part, deliberate. He has signaled—through intermediaries—that he is willing to engage only with one individual: General Asim Munir. The logic is blunt. Munir is widely perceived as the central node of power, the ultimate decision-maker across political, judicial, and security institutions.

This posture has elevated the confrontation into a personalized standoff: popularity versus power. Khan’s supporters interpret his refusal to compromise as proof of moral resolve. His prolonged detention has paradoxically strengthened his appeal, reinforcing the narrative of an elected leader punished for defiance rather than wrongdoing.

Yet beneath the theatrics of clashing egos lies a more enduring reality. Military supremacy over civilian governance remains intact. The institutional balance has not shifted; if anything, it has hardened.

Consolidation of Power at the Center

While Khan’s influence has grown symbolically, General Asim Munir’s authority has expanded materially. Following a brief but politically significant confrontation with India in May, Munir experienced a surge in domestic approval. His subsequent elevation to the rank of field marshal—a rare distinction—cemented his standing within Pakistan’s power hierarchy and enhanced his international profile.

This consolidation accelerated with a package of constitutional and legal changes affecting both the military and the judiciary. The reforms tightened institutional alignment and reduced ambiguity over command and oversight, effectively concentrating authority at the center.

From prison, Khan responded with increasing urgency. His messages grew sharper, describing the current order not as martial law but as personalized rule—an indictment aimed squarely at Munir. The rhetoric underscored how the conflict had evolved from a political dispute into a contest over the nature of the state itself.

Digital Politics Without Borders

What differentiates this confrontation from earlier episodes in Pakistan’s history is the digital ecosystem surrounding it. Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf has adapted aggressively to technological constraints. AI-generated avatars of Khan addressing rallies, coordinated social media campaigns, and encrypted messaging platforms have allowed his presence to persist despite physical isolation.

Crucially, much of this activity now operates beyond Pakistan’s jurisdiction. Accounts managed from Europe, North America, and the Gulf cannot be easily suppressed by domestic authorities. This externalization of political discourse has been accelerated by conditions inside Pakistan, where the Asif–Sharif–Zardari regime has made independent journalism increasingly untenable. Reporters and commentators who publish material critical of the government face political FIRs, intimidation, or, in some cases, enforced disappearances carried out by security agencies. Traditional media outlets have been brought under tight control, narrowing the space for dissenting coverage.

As a result, the informational battlefield has shifted outward. Family members—particularly Khan’s sons and sisters—have amplified the narrative through sustained appearances on international media platforms, relocating scrutiny from Pakistan’s censored domestic sphere to global audiences. In doing so, they have exposed the limits of state control in an era where political legitimacy, reputation, and pressure are no longer confined within national borders.

Khan’s reported solitary confinement has further intensified scrutiny. International outlets, rather than domestic broadcasters, have become the primary conduits of information—highlighting the limits of traditional media control in a globalized information environment.

The Exiled Chorus

Parallel to Khan’s isolation, a growing number of former officials, journalists, and party figures now operate from abroad. Many have reinvented themselves as YouTubers and digital commentators, producing a constant stream of updates, commentary, and—at times—unverified claims.

The government accuses these voices of misinformation and incitement. The exiles respond that they rely on publicly available reporting and official statements. What is clear is that the state’s tools for narrative management—effective in television studios and newsrooms—are far less potent in decentralized digital spaces.

Attempts to threaten extradition or initiate legal action against overseas commentators have had limited deterrent effect. Instead, they have reinforced perceptions of a sustained campaign to silence dissent beyond Pakistan’s borders.

An Unresolved Equation

The Imran Khan–Asim Munir standoff encapsulates a familiar Pakistani dilemma in an unfamiliar form. A popular civilian leader confronts an entrenched security establishment. The methods have evolved, the platforms have multiplied, but the underlying structure remains unchanged.

Khan’s imprisonment has not resolved the political crisis. Nor has it extinguished his relevance. At the same time, the consolidation of military authority suggests that institutional dominance is unlikely to be challenged in the near term.

What remains unresolved is the cost. To governance, to credibility, and to a system increasingly reliant on containment rather than consent. As long as one man commands popularity from a prison cell and another consolidates power through constitutional engineering, Pakistan’s political equilibrium will remain unstable—held together not by reconciliation, but by force and fatigue.

PART A: 1-PAGE EXECUTIVE NOTE

Weekly Strategic Executive Note — Pakistan

Reporting Period: 05 December 2025 – 12 December 2025
Audience: US President | EU High Representative | UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Prepared by: Principal Geopolitical Advisor
Analytical Origin: PolicyDeck.News

Key Findings (Decision-Relevant)

Coercive stability has replaced political legitimacy.
Pakistan is maintaining short-term order through administrative coercion, judicialized repression, and securitized information control rather than democratic consent. This model increases medium-term instability and legitimacy erosion.

Selective accountability masks power consolidation.
The Faiz Hameed verdict reflects internal recalibration within the security establishment, not systemic reform or civilian oversight. Accountability remains personalized while institutional power structures are preserved.

Opposition neutralization is accelerating.
The isolation of Imran Khan, restrictions on family and legal access, and the extraordinary number of cases constitute arbitrary detention and legal attrition, producing de facto political exclusion.

Civic space is contracting through force and fear.
The use of water cannons against peaceful protesters at Adiala Jail and pervasive media self-censorship meet thresholds for suppression of peaceful assembly and constraints on freedom of expression.

IMF stabilization collides with governance failure.
IMF disbursements provide short-term liquidity, but the IMF’s own governance and corruption diagnostic confirms elite capture and weak enforcement, threatening medium-term program credibility.

Security volatility reinforces authoritarian drift.
Persistent militancy and Afghanistan border tensions are increasingly used to justify domestic securitization and political containment.

Actionable Recommendations (US / EU / UN – Collective)

• Condition diplomatic engagement on verifiable due-process compliance, including court-ordered visitation and minimum family, legal, and medical access for political detainees.

• Elevate assembly-rights violations to priority diplomatic monitoring and early-warning status.

• Integrate the IMF Governance & Corruption Diagnostic into all economic and political engagements; avoid legitimizing stabilization without enforcement reform.

• Refrain from presenting selective military accountability as institutional reform.

• Activate OHCHR documentation and Special Procedures engagement on arbitrary detention, suppression of assembly, and judicial independence.

PART B: FULL WEEKLY BRIEF

To: US President; EU High Representative; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
From: Principal Geopolitical Advisor
Date: 14 December 2025
Subject: Strategic Assessment of Pakistan: Political Stability, Economic Outlook, and Human Rights Status
Reporting Period: 05 December 2025 – 12 December 2025
Analytical Origin: PolicyDeck.News

1. Political Stability & Governance

Executive Summary / Key Findings

State power is consolidating through legal-administrative instruments rather than electoral legitimacy. Civil–military boundaries are increasingly blurred, and judicial processes are being used as tools of political containment.

Assessment

PolicyDeck’s analysis during the reporting period indicates a shift toward administrative governance backed by coercion. The DG ISPR press conference functioned as a political message to domestic audiences, reinforcing the normalization of uniformed political intervention in civilian discourse.

The conviction of former ISI chief Faiz Hameed should be understood as selective internal discipline rather than systemic accountability. No civilian oversight mechanisms were engaged, and no institutional doctrines were examined. Opposition politics remain constrained through judicial pressure, detention-related access restrictions, and preventive policing around sensitive sites.

2. Economic Landscape & Policy

Executive Summary / Key Findings

IMF-driven stabilization continues but is structurally fragile due to governance and corruption constraints.

Assessment

While IMF support has provided short-term relief, the IMF’s Governance and Corruption Diagnostic confirms elite capture, weak enforcement, and politicized economic institutions. Political engineering has crowded out technocratic reform capacity, undermining investor confidence and locking Pakistan into a stabilization cycle dependent on external financing.

3. Military & Security Posture

Executive Summary / Key Findings

Internal militancy and border volatility persist, reinforcing a securitized governance model.

Assessment

Militant activity in the northwest and instability along the Afghanistan border continue to strain internal security capacity. These threats are increasingly invoked to justify expanded domestic security measures, including digital regulation and restrictions on political activity. While counterterrorism cooperation remains necessary, conflating security threats with political dissent carries significant legitimacy costs.

4. Human Rights & Rule of Law

Executive Summary / Key Findings

The reporting period meets thresholds for arbitrary detention, suppression of peaceful assembly, and freedom of expression violations.

Assessment

The prolonged isolation of Imran Khan, disputed compliance with court-ordered visitation, and restricted family and legal access constitute serious due-process concerns under international standards. The use of water cannons against peaceful protesters outside Adiala Jail represents disproportionate force against lawful assembly.

The extraordinary number of cases filed against a single opposition leader functions as legal attrition, producing effective political exclusion without formal disqualification. Media self-censorship and avoidance of foundational legal questions indicate coercive pressure on the press.

5. Strategic Implications & Recommendations

Executive Summary / Key Findings

Pakistan is sustaining order at the cost of legitimacy, increasing both domestic instability and international human-rights exposure.

Recommendations

• Enforce due-process conditionality in diplomatic engagement.

• Prioritize monitoring of assembly-rights violations.

• Align economic engagement with measurable governance enforcement.

• Avoid legitimizing selective accountability as reform.

• Expand UN human-rights documentation mechanisms.

6. Short-Term Outlook (0–2 Months)

Executive Summary / Key Findings

Detention-access disputes are likely to trigger renewed protests and force deployments. IMF scrutiny will intensify in the post-disbursement phase, and ongoing security incidents will continue to justify domestic securitization.

Assessment

Further disputes over court-ordered visitation are likely to provoke repeated mobilization near detention facilities, increasing escalation risks. IMF implementation pressure will heighten political blame-shifting, while militant violence sustains a security-first governance posture.

7. Long-Term Scenarios & Collapse Pathways (12–18 Months)

Executive Summary / Key Findings

Pakistan faces low-probability but high-impact destabilization risks.

Scenarios

Constitutional legitimacy crisis:
With the judiciary largely aligned with the government and military, a clash between lawyers, the executive, and security institutions poses a credible risk of governance paralysis and nationwide unrest.

Security-driven authoritarian escalation:
Sustained border or militant escalation leads to extraordinary security measures, accelerating civic-space collapse and international isolation.

IMF program credibility rupture:
Governance non-compliance undermines program confidence, triggering currency stress, renewed austerity, and social instability.

Strategic Bottom Line

Pakistan is governing through coercion and legal attrition, supported by external IMF financing but undermined by legitimacy erosion. Without systemic governance reform, the trajectory points toward managed instability with episodic escalation, not durable recovery.

The sentencing of a former senior intelligence official to 14 years of imprisonment marks an uncommon moment in Pakistan’s civil–military history. Observers familiar with the December developments note that convictions of this level are rare and often framed as watershed moments. Yet historical patterns suggest caution. Accountability actions within the military domain have frequently been selective, designed to isolate individual figures while leaving broader institutional practices intact.

What makes this episode significant is not only the severity of the sentence but the explicit acknowledgment—through official communication—that political interference, misuse of authority, and violations of secrecy laws were part of the charges. This acknowledgment moves beyond vague references to “discipline” and places political activity squarely within the scope of punishable conduct. The question is whether this represents a genuine shift toward systemic accountability or a controlled intervention aimed at managing public pressure.

More: Behind the Optics: What the Faiz Hameed Verdict Reveals About Pakistan’s Power Struggle

Law, Process, and the Boundaries of Transparency

According to journalists covering the civil–military situation, the legal process followed established military procedures, including the right to counsel and avenues for appeal. From a formal legal standpoint, this satisfies procedural requirements. However, transparency remains limited. Court-martial proceedings are not public, evidence is not disclosed, and findings are communicated through brief institutional statements rather than detailed judgments.

This opacity creates a credibility gap. While the sentence signals enforcement, the absence of publicly verifiable detail restricts independent assessment of proportionality, consistency, and precedent. At the same time, political supporters and legal observers point to a broader pattern surrounding the detention of former prime minister Imran Khan, noting that more than 200 political cases have been filed against him. They argue that these cases are intended to break his political resistance to military involvement in democratic processes, to use the political parties associated with the Sharif and Zardari families as instruments of governance, and to keep him incarcerated for an extended period. According to these accounts, offers of release in exchange for prolonged political silence were made on multiple occasions and were reportedly declined by Imran Khan. They further contend that expedited late-night court proceedings, followed by lengthy adjournments, have been used to prolong legal uncertainty, allowing the current political arrangement to remain intact. In democratic systems, accountability derives not only from punishment but from visibility—allowing society to understand how decisions were made and whether standards will apply uniformly in the future. Critics also argue that following the 27th constitutional amendment, the judicial order itself has been severely undermined.

Individual Guilt Versus Institutional Conduct

Independent political analysts argue that the case of former ISI chief General Faiz Hameed exposes a deeper structural flaw in Pakistan’s civil–military framework. Large-scale political interference cannot be executed by a single officer acting in isolation; it requires a functioning chain of command and coordination across intelligence agencies and institutional actors. Activities such as intelligence operations, electoral management, and information control are inherently collective processes within the military establishment’s political role. Viewed in this context, assigning accountability to one retired general raises serious questions about how responsibility is defined and distributed across the wider military and intelligence system

The sentencing of former ISI chief General Faiz Hameed represents an unprecedented moment in Pakistan’s military history. For the first time, a senior intelligence chief has been formally convicted for political interference—something that was never pursued against past military rulers or dictators. However, this very novelty sharpens the underlying question raised by analysts: while the punishment establishes an important precedent, it also isolates accountability at the level of a single retired officer. Given the hierarchical and coordinated nature of intelligence operations and political management, the case inevitably invites scrutiny over whether responsibility is being narrowly defined, rather than examined across the wider command structures and institutional mechanisms through which such actions are typically executed.